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Abstract 
Various type quality accidents occurred and reported in the field of different product in the large manufacturing companies, how to identify the 
root causes and rank the mitigation measures are always a puzzle for their quality and after-sales departments. Therefore, in order to improve 
the failure mechanism modeling ability of quality improvement methods, the extended FTA (Fault tree analysis) considering the common cause 
failures effect and failure cost are introduced into the risk analysis for product quality accident at the first time. Firstly, risk analysis basics for 
quality accident of risk formation mechanism, common cause failures and extended FTA model are defined. Secondly, quality accident risk 
computation model based on failure cost is presented to quantitate the risk. Thirdly, an integrated quality accident risk analysis approach is 
established, which includes the root causes analyzing and safety measures ranking. Finally, a case study of quality risk analysis for cooling 
system is carried out to verify the proposed method. 
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1. Introduction 
Quality accidents (QAs) are the breakdowns occurred in 
the usage stage of complex product and engineering system, 
due to inferior quality in design and production, which have 
significant adverse impacts on the product performance, 
human and environment etc. When a quality accident occurred, 
it is important for manufacturers to find out the root causes 
and effective safety measures to mitigate the risk proactively 
in design and manufacturing process. Generally, quality 
problems (QPs) occurring before usage stage are identified as 
the causes of QAs. Therefore, quality problems and 
corresponding variations of quality characteristics (QCs), 
especially the key quality characteristics (KQCs), are 
attracting more and more research interests [1-3]. However, 
different QPs have different impactˈ and common cause 
failure increase the difficulty to identify root causes, which is 
omitted by the traditional accident analysis methods such as 
FTA and FMECA (Failure mode, effects and criticality 
analysis) [4-6]. So manufacturers need applicable methods to 
analyze the relationship between Qas and QPs for the quality 
improvement. 
General accidents are partly similar to QAs. Most of 
previous studies on general accident analysis use the 
conceptual representation or summary statistics. Li et al. (2015) 
investigated 148 accident cases and found out that some 
special characteristics in China were different from western 
countries [7]. Akyuz (2015) presented a hybrid approach 
basically incorporates AcciMap (Accident Analyse Mapping) 
and ANP (Analytical Network Process) methods to analyze 
causes of marine accidents [8]. These methods do not 
elucidate accident mechanism and cannot propose and rank 
safety measures to prevent accidents. Hence, some researchers 
presented optimized methods. Wang et al. (2013) proposed an 
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accident analysis model which stressed the cost-efficient 
strategy [9]. Martins and Maturana (2013) presented a method 
based on Bayesian Belief Networks to determine the most 
likely sequence of hazardous events [10]. However, accident 
formation mechanisms are still fuzzy. 
Deficiencies of previous researches come from the lack of 
valid data and the omission of the risk formation mechanism, 
namely, the quantitative relationship between QAs and its 
corresponding QPs in design and production. To describe the 
relationship, FTA is an appropriate method [11]. As 
mentioned above, traditional FTA can only consider the 
independent failure. So we need to extend the original method 
in order to analyzing the more complex failure mode [12]. 
In this paper, the mechanism of QA is clarified. Therefore, 
a quality accident analysis model which contains FTA 
considering CCFs (common cause failures), Bayes formula 
and marginal analysis is proposed to analyze the risk of QAs 
from the viewpoint of the manufacturers. Furthermore, by the 
aid of the presented model, the manufacturer can identify root 
causes and determine the most efficient safety measures to 
fulfill the maximum profit point. 
2. Risk analysis basics for product quality accident 
2.1 Common cause failures (CCFs) 
In the reliability analysis of complex network systems or 
engineering products, kinds of factors including hacker attack 
or network virus may cause failures of their multiple items 
[13], and usually several components may perform poorer or 
even be failed because of the same reason. Such fault 
symptoms due to a common cause (CC) are referred to as 
common cause failures (CCFs). Essentially, a common cause 
failure is the failure where: 
z More than one component turns into failure state 
during a specified time such that designed function 
could not realize. 
z Components fail due to a common cause and coupling 
factor. 
All CCFs can be divided into two categories based on their 
effects on the affected components: deterministic common 
cause failure (DCCF) and probabilistic common cause failure 
(PCCF). A DCCF results in guaranteed or deterministic 
failures of all components affected while a PCCF cause 
failures of different components affected with different 
probability [14].  
2.2Risk formation mechanism of product quality accident  
QPs are referred to the failures occurred in the design and 
development phases, which could form defects and induce 
quality accidents in the usage phase. Before usage stage, 
various QPs should occur due to the uncontrolled factors of 
5M1E (Man, Method, Measurement, Material, Machine and 
Environment), which are generally considered as the root 
causes of quality accidents. Not all QPs will lead to serious 
QAs. For a specific product, functioning correctly or not is 
always decided by the quality of key functional components. 
We should pay attention to those QPs which make loss to 
KQCs and such QPs are called key quality problems (KQPs). 
In the product lifecycle, quality problems should occur and 
accumulate continuously. Meanwhile, defects are caused by 
KQPs and then be built in the product. Note that in practical 
design and development process, total KQPs are more than 
those which directly affect KQCs because of the CCF effect. 
According CCF, a non-key quality problem may do harm to 
more than one KQC although there is no direct link between 
the QP and each involved KQCs superficially. In other words, 
CCFs cause the transformation from non-key quality problem 
to KQP, which could lead to more defects. These two steps 
occur in design and manufacturing stage respectively. After 
products enter use stage, parts with defects are induced under 
certain conditions and turn into serious failures. Accordingly, 
deadly failures trigger disastrous QAs. The quality problem 
driven accident formation process is depicted in Figure.1 
Design
stage
Use
stage
Lifecycle
Defects
Failure
Quality
accidentK
Q
C
s
Induced
Suddenly
emerged
Quality problems
K
Q
C
s
Induced
Manufacturing
stage
Environment
stress
Quality problems
Defects
Affect
 
Fig. 1. Quality problem driven accident formation mechanism. 
In Figure. 1, the width of rectangles represents the number 
of events and the height represents the degree of event 
adverse effect. Obviously, QP is numerous but slight while 
QA is scarce but catastrophic. The manufacturers should cut 
down the number of the quality problems occurred in the 
design and development to prevent QA. 
2.3 Extended FTA model 
It is usually believed that CCFs must be parts of main root 
causes and should be solved firstly just because more 
components are affected. However, the speculation is often at 
variance with the actual situation. Therefore, we use an 
extended FTA model considering CCFs to determine the main 
root causes and ranking their priority. 
The obvious advantage of FTA is that we can accurately 
seek out the quantitative relationship between accident 
symptoms and root causes. However, the advantage is derived 
from clear logical relationship of product structure and precise 
probabilistic data of every componen.  Fortunately, logical 
relationships between components and reliable data are both 
attainable for the manufacturers. It allows us to establish the 
extended FTA model containing CCFs to analyze how each 
root cause contributes to the final accident. The quantitative 
analysis based on the extended FTA model can present the 
risk formation mechanism of the occurred quality accident. 
The theoretical basis of the proposed model is introduced 
below. 
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The failure of the component related to CCFs does not 
have to be caused by CCFs. Essentially, each component can 
be failed due to the following two causes: 
z The independent causes which only relate to the 
specific component. 
z The common causes (CCs) which can affect several 
components at the same time. 
The above presented fact could be represented by the 
following formula: 
I CO O O                                  (1) 
where¬ represents the total failure rate of the component,
¬i  is the independent part and¬c is the part caused by CCs. 
The below Fault tree model can describe general condition 
that contains n PCCFs, the result is shown in the Figure 2. 
X fail
OR
AND
CC1
Xi
Xc1
AND
CCn Xcn
…...
Fig. 2. Extendedfault tree model containing n PCCFs. 
where CCi is the i th common cause that affects component X, 
XCi means the conditional failure events of component X 
caused by CCi and Xi is the local failure event of component 
X. Since a PCCF event typically affects more than one 
componentˈ the same CC event may appear more than once 
in the extended fault tree model.  
3. Product quality accident risk computation model based 
on failure cost  
QAs may cause adverse impacts on the product, human and 
environment etc. Therefore, the complexity of damage 
impedes the accurate assessment the risk of the occurred QAs 
by a comparable and universal indicator, which causes the 
ranking of different QAs risk to be a puzzle for manufacturers. 
To solve this problem, we present a modified computation 
method based on the total-cost industrial accident model to 
quantized main probable loss by failure cost so that damage 
can be translated into economic losses, which contributes to 
both root causes risk analysis and safety measures cost-benefit 
analysis [15]. When quality accidents occurred, the loss cost 
always contain the following three parts: 
(1)The cost paid for repair the damage to staffs and 
equipment and environment;  
(2)Some do exist but are not simple to calculate, such as the 
slowdown in production which may cause damages to the 
client. 
(3)The last part is the costs which are impossible to precise 
compute at present [16]. 
For calculating the total cost, all parameters that reflect 
the possible costs should be taken into account. In order to 
guarantee the accuracy of the computation, imponderable 
costs are not involved in the paper. Therefore, the estimable 
parts are divided into the following 3 categories: Direct cost,  
Indirect cost and Payment. The formulas are presented as 
follows: 
q D I PC C C C                                (2) 
where direct cost CD is the  almost inevitable part and can be 
given by accounting while indirect costs are which may 
appear but cannot be ignored;CI is the indirect costs ,which 
may larger than direct one. Payment CP describes the 
additional marginal cost about new employees wage drift 
and the compensation for injured workers, only the relative 
change of cost should be considered. 
Specifically, the direct costs can be formulated as: 
D damage medical fine insuranceC C C C C          (3) 
where Cdamage is the sum of damage of products, equipment 
and machine and cost of cleaning and returning the working 
area back to functioning; Cmedical is immediate medical 
treatment costs if people are injured; Cfine  is possible fines due 
to violations of safety procedures or breaking the law;Cinsurance 
is the premium increase. 
The parameters which reflect the indirect costs are 
formulated as follow: 
I capacity loss schedule work time WIP mangmentC C C C C C       (4) 
where Ccapacity loss is the cost caused by capacity loss. A failure 
due to quality accident can cause a slowdown and even 
production halts; Cschedule describes the condition that 
slowdown in production will affect the time table schedule 
and cause damages to the client so clients may cancel the 
contract or demand a lower price; Cwork time is the cost work 
managers invest in investigating the accident. Work time is 
also dedicated to instruction of the simple workers. Also the 
additional work hours that needed to replace the injured 
worker; CWIP is cost that the managers need to find a solution 
to fit the inventory to the new production condition for Work 
In Process (WIP) which will cause additional expenses.; 
Cmanagement is the cost from CEO’s time. 
For ease of use, we rewrite the formula of Payment as: 
2newPC M Pay RE B NI W u    u              (5) 
where M is number of months the injured workers is replaced; 
Paynew is Salaries of all new employees per month; RE is the 
cost of hiring additional workers to replace the injured ones, 
which includes the time invested in recruiting and training the 
new workers; B is Sum of benefits given to the injured 
workers; NI is National insurance refund; W2 is number of 
injured workers. 
4. Quality accidents risk analysis approach 
4.1Quality accident risk analyzing framework 
Based on the risk management principles and the 
demands of risk analyzing of QAs, a quality accident risk 
analyzing framework is shown in the Figure. 3. As shown in 
the above Figure, the presented accident analysis framework 
includes the following four parts.  
(1) Risk identification. The major task is to expound the 
risk formation mechanism by the proposed extended FTA, the 
identification result is the possible root cause list. 
(2) Risk assessment.The key task is to rank the weight of 
all possible root causes and identify the key root causes based 
on their weights computed by the Bayes formula. In addition, 
the sensitivity analysis based on pivotal importance degree 
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should be carried out. 
(3) Risk mitigation. The primary task is to find the 
possible safety measures to mitigate the risk. The Marginal 
Analysis method and cost-benefit ratio should be adopted to 
compute weights. 
(4) Risk monitoring. The main aim is to control the risk 
level by control charts of TBE (time-between-events) and etc. 
In addition, the early warning of the variations of the product 
quality risk should be considered as well.  
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Fig. 3. Quality accident risk analyzing framework. 
4.2Root causes risk analysis 
In reliability and risk analysisˈBayes formula below is 
widely used to compute the weight of the possible root causes 
when the event has occurred: 
1
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whereA1,A2,…,An constitute a complete event group. 
From Equation(6), we can obtain the contribution to 
occurrence of the occurred quality accident for a specific 
possible root cause. 
Because of CCFsˈthe minimal cut sets of fault tree  are 
always intersected, so the probability of the intersection event 
should be computed by the following formula˖ 
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where Ki is the kth minimal cut set and nis the number of 
minimal cut sets. 
ObviouslyˈPCCFs considered in the extended FTA makes 
the calculation very large for accurate manual calculation. 
Fortunately, it is unnecessary to calculate the probability of 
top event accurately in actual conditions. That is because: 
z Failure data about bottom events is often empirical 
and imprecise, pursuing accurate calculation of top 
event blindly is meaningless. 
z The reliability of modern product is very high, in other 
words, hazard rate of bottom events is often in a low 
level. Therefore, the probability of top event 
converges quickly according to above formula.  
From the above discussion, we can get the approximate 
calculation formula of the top event as: 
1 2
( ) ( ) ( )
n n
i i j
i i j
P T P K P K K
   
| ¦ ¦                       (8) 
If probability of root cause is very low, we can even only 
use the first item: 
1
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|¦                                  (9) 
Combining Equation (6),(8)and (9), main root causes can 
be identified based on conditional probabilityP(Ai|T). 
If several root causes own the same conditional probability, 
sensitivity analysis based on pivotal importance degree should 
be done as follow: 
( )
( )
, 1,2, , 1, 1, ,
( )
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i P A p
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P A  
w   w
      (10) 
Finallyˈmain root causes can be identified and ranked 
based on the conditional probability as well as sensitivity. 
Then, manufacturing sector should put forward corresponding 
safety measures to reduce the adverse impact caused by main 
root causes. 
4.3 Safety measures cost- benefit analysis 
Upon proposed safety measures, cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) on each safety measure will be the next step. CBA 
aims to rank different safety measures by identifying the 
benefit from accident prevention and the cost associated with 
safety measures. 
4.3.1Cost-benefit ratio computation 
The reduction of possible losses could be regarded as 
profits, so cost-benefit ratio is defined as follow: 
q qp C
r
C
'                               (11) 
Where pq is the change of the probability for quality 
accident,Cq is the failure cost due to the occurred quality 
accident,C is the average cost regarding  a specific safety 
measure per item. 
Equation(11) shows expected cut of quality accident loss 
under every unit of input. Obviously, those safety measures 
whose cost-benefit ratio is high should be chosen firstly. 
4.3.2Identify the degree of safe measures 
Usually, more costs will get higher reliability, but the 
improvement cost will be extremely high if the component 
already has a high reliability. Because of the non-linear 
relationship between cost and benefit, an appropriate degree 
of safety measures should be determined. 
According marginal analysis theory, improvement should 
be stopped when increased cost equals to increased benefit: 
 0q qmarginal revenue p C C '                   (12) 
In other words, the normalcost-benefit ratio is ‘1’(The 
bigger, the better): 
1q q
p C
r
C
'                                (13) 
5. Case study 
 
 According to client feedback for a provider of cooling 
system in China, the quality of a kind of cooling system 
designed for cooling explosive fuel tanks is unsatisfactory due 
to the frequent failures. Designers try to find out the root 
causes and prove safety measures to improve product quality 
and mitigate quality risk in design and manufacturing 
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processes.This system is composed by 5 valves,its structure is 
shown in Figure.4. 
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Fig. 4. Inner structure of thecooling system  
Suppose that blocking is the only failure mode of 5 valves 
and explosive fuel tank will explode when output is zero. 
Valve Band valve E are both affected by event X (Abnormal 
increase of temperature) and conditional failure probabilities 
given the occurrence of event X are constants. 
Suppose the following parameter values and notations are 
used in the analysis example: 
a. Independent failure rate: 
0.02, 0.03, 0.04B E A D Cp p p p p      
b. Conditional failure probability given the occurrence of 
event X: 
0.07B Eq q   
c. Occurrence probability of event X: 
0.005Xp   
d. Notations: 
Bi , Ei : Independent failure of the valve; Bc, Ec: common 
cause failure caused by CC. 
According to the proposed method, the risk of the explosive 
event is analyzed as follows. 
5.1Root causes risk analysis 
Step 1: List possible root causes. 
a. Independent failure of valve. It is the most usual root cause. 
b. Harmful event X (CC) which may cause CCFsincluding 
valve B and E.It is less likely to occur, but we should pay 
close attention if CC does contribute more to finally accident.  
c. Conditional failure of valve B and E given by CC. If the 
probability of event X is already low, conditional failure given 
by CC may become noticeable causes. 
Step 2: Establish an extended fault tree based on the fault tree. 
The extended fault tree is shown in Figure.5. 
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Fig. 5. Extended fault tree considering the effects of PCCFs. 
Step3: Main root causes identification. 
As shown in Figure 6, there are 7 Minimal Cut Sets (MCS) 
in the above extended fault tree. They are: 
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According to Equation (9), the top event probability is 
expressed as follow: 
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Then, according to Equation (6) and (10), the conditional 
probability ( | )iP A T  and sensitivity can be obtained. Results 
are listed in Table.1. 
Table 1. Results of conditional probability and sensitivity. 
 A Bi C D Ei X 
P(Ai |T) 0.510 0.566 0.820 0.623 0.247 0.136 
sensitivity 0.306 0.700 0.535 0.471 0.090 0.553 
 
So independent failure of valve C and D should be two 
main root causes. Moreover, independent failure Bi should be 
paid more attention because of its high sensitivity. Although 
event X affects both B and E, we demonstrate that it is 
unremarkable actually by specific calculation. 
5.2 Safety measures analysis 
Step 1: List possible safety measures. 
a. Select higher quality components. 
b. Advance manufacturing technique of the valve. 
c. Optimize the design of the valve. 
d. Set protector for valve. 
In this example, we only consider the improvement of 
every single valve. Promotion about the whole cooling system 
should be considered and the extended fault tree may need to 
be reestablished. 
 
Step2: Evaluate the product quality accident costs 
 (1)Direct costs 
According to the accounting, Direct costs are gotten as 
follows: 
4000 2280 1000 3000 10280D damage medical fine insuranceC C C C C          
(2)Indirect costs 
In this specific example, there is a backup. Therefore, 
production is not hurt due to the quality accident and no new 
bottleneck is occurred. So, it can be computed below: 
0 0 2460 0 1800 4260
I capacity loss schedule work time WIP mangmentC C C C C C    
      
 
(3)Payments 
Some workers who do other job in this factory are selected 
to replace the injured ones, so additional training is needed. 
National insurance is all given to injured workers. Then, the 
payment cost can be computed as follows: 
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2
0 180 180
nepayment wC M Pay RE B NI W u    u
   
 
So the total product quality accident costs caused by 
exploding are 10280+4260+180=14720. 
Step3: Computing cost-benefit ratio  
According to the technological level, failure probability of 
valve C can be decreased to 0.015 by safety measure a(Select 
higher quality components) and the cost per item will increase 
13 dollars. Manufacturer can also reduce failure probability of 
valve C to 0.005 by safety measure b(Advance manufacturing 
technique of the valve) but the cost per item will increase 35 
dollars.Similarly, failure probability of valve D can be 
decrease to 0.01 by safety measure c(Optimize the design of 
the valve) and the cost per item will increase 12 dollars. 
Manufacturer can also reduce failure probability of valve C to 
0.008 by safety measured (Set protector for valve) and the 
cost per item will increase 22 dollars.  
According to Equation (11), cost-benefit ratio of safety 
measure a  is: 
( ) (0.00306 0.00172) 14720
1.52
13
q q qp C P T C
r
C C
' ' u  u    
Similarly, the other three cost-benefit ratios can be 
computed. Table.2 shows the final results of the cost-benefit 
ratio computation. 
Table 2. Results of cost-benefit ratio computation. 
Safety measure a b c d 
qp'  0.00134 0.00187 0.00094 0.00103 
r  1.52 0.98 1.15 0.69 
From the above cost-benefit ratio computation result, 
safety measure a and c could be adopted to mitigate the risk 
of the top event.That is to say, manufacturer should pay 
attention to control the quality deviation of the key parts of 
Valve C in manufacturing process, and redesign Valve D if 
possible. 
6. Conclusions 
In the paper, we propose a product quality accidents risk 
analyzing approach based on the extended FTA and failure 
cost. It helps the manufacturer to identify the root causes as 
well as look for effective quality improvement measures from 
the viewpoint of risk propagation mechanism. Firstly, risk 
analysis basics for quality accident of risk formation 
mechanism, common cause failures and extended FTA model 
are given respectively. Then, risk oriented quality problem 
driven accident formation mechanism is presented to explain 
how small quality problems lead to the disastrous quality 
accident from the product lifecycle viewpoint. The product 
quality accident analysis model by combining extended FTA 
considering CCFs, Bayes formula and marginal analysis is 
proposed. With the aid of the presented model, the manuf-
acturer can identify root causes and determine the most 
efficient safety measures to fulfill the maximum profit point, 
which is verified by case study.  
Establishing an extended FTA considering CCFs is 
complicated, which should take a lot of time and effort, 
improvement in the failure propagation mechanism is needed 
for the proposed model. Moreover, hidden quality costs are 
not involved in our study. Future topics like the cascading 
failure mode and other reasonable quality cost computing 
method shall be further studied. 
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